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LATIN-AMERICAN LEGAL PHLOSOPHY. By Luis Recas~ns Siches, Carlos Cos-
sio, Juan Llambias de Azevedo, Eduardo Garcia Mfiynez. Translated by
Gordon Ireland, Milton R. Konvitz, Miguel A. de Capriles and Jorge Roberto
Hayzus, with an introduction by Josef L. Kunz, Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1948. Pp. 577. $6.00.
THIS volume, the third in the 20th Century Legal Philosophy series spon-
sored by the Association of American Law Schools, opens wide horizons to
the practitioner who has had little opportunity to delve into modem, especially
German, philosophy. It will acquaint him more readily than any other source
with the intellectual achievements and the problems that are engaging atten-
tion in other parts of the world.
When we recall how difficult it is to arouse interest here even in our modest
jurisprudence, one is amazed at the pre-occupation of Latin Americans with
philosophies of law in their most abstract form. Is it because they find their
law so unsatisfactory, with constitutions so often scraps of paper, that they
seek refuge in "that sweet milk of adversity, philosophy"? Whatever the
reason, there is fervid interest in the subject and this volume is a small sample
of the voluminous literature Latin American presses have been pouring out.
After a masterly introduction, three-fifths of the volume is a translation of
a complete work of Recastns Siches. It is not easy reading but well repays the
trouble. An adherent, as are all the other authors, of philosophy of values,
Recas~ns first analyzes the place of law in the universe of the philosophers. All
positive law, he believes, is an attempt to attain just law. Human life is the
underlying basic reality, and must embody juristics-a self-evident precept the
author thereafter seems to neglect. It is his theory that the content of posi-
tive law varies with time and place, but the function of the law is constant-
security in social life. The subject of the law is never the real man of flesh
and blood but only a personified mask, the citizen, the creditor, the buyer, etc.
It is evident he never had to address a jury.
Carried to its conclusion, this theory of personality, largely derived from
Kelsen, would mean that law is not made for men, but man is made by and
hence for the law, since the law is identical with the state (Kelsen again). In
other words, it leads to totalitarianism, which is thoroughly abhorrent to Re-
cas6ns and which he analyzes profoundly without being conscious of the in-
consistency with his theory of law. Yet, what becomes of our inalienable
rights under his theory of personality? Are we to give up the Bill of Rights
in our quest for a theory of law? The Pure Law-State too readily becomes
the Purge State.
Recas~ns, however, does not implicitly follow Kelsen. Both he and the other
authors engage in rectifications or criticisms of Kelsen, which will please
those who have no great admiration for the Pure Theory of Law. His own
theory Recas6ns calls a superstructure on Kelsen's. One of the most inter-
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esting parts of the book is the discussion of the nature of the State-which
he considers a purely philosophical, not a legal, question. All forms of law
(statutes, custom, case-law, regulations, the binding force of contracts) pre-
vail only by.authority of the State. At the head of the hierarchy stands the
Constitution, the fundamental norm. The Constitution lies outside the strictly
juridical. It has to be taken for granted. The "first" constitution, arising by
revolution or when a new state is established, has no legal, but only historical
and sociological foundations. And the deepest root of the juridical command
is never material force, but support in public opinion and at least passive
popular adherence. This, however, is inconsistent with his thesis of the
inexorability of law.
According to Recas6ns, compulsion is of the essence of law but compul-
sion is not enough. One must distinguish between law, with its inevitable
regularity, and arbitrary commands. "It is peculiarly an essential characteristic
of the 'juridical norm to control necessarily the very person who enacted it."
This is simply our doctrine of the Supremacy of Law, better expounded by
Dicey and Pound-a reality with us, merely nostalgia abroad. Nor is the
author too successful in his attempt to differentiate the arbitrary mandate
which is not law, from the permissible exercise of judicial and administrative
discretion.
The final and lengthiest chapter of Recas~ns' book is entitled Juridical
Valuation, the problem of law "that ought to be." The concept of positive
law is unrealizable without reference to an ideal of justice. Having justified
the problem as intrinsically worth while, he discusses at great length four
questions, and comes to the following conclusions:
1. The basic foundation of juridical valuation is not empirical but necessar-
ily a priori. But he seems to give his case away when he admits that pure
ideas of value are insufficient; they 'must be combined with experience. 2.
The ideas for the valuation of the law are not subjective and psychological,
but objective ideas with necessary validity. 3. He harmonizes the fulfilment
of a priori ideas of juridical value with the process of history, but maintains
that there are superior values, good for all times and places, which enjoy
necessary preference, i.e., human dignity, freedom of conscience, individual
liberty. Legislative reformers must be more like doctors than physicists or
engineers. To assure respect for the dignity of the person by creating order
and security is the basic motivation for establishing rules of law. 4. The
paradox that unanimous agreement on the theme of justice has been accom-
panied by the utmost diversity and bloody strife in the practical application
of the idea of justice is due to the fact that the rule of harmonious equality
and proportionality (our "equality is equity") does not in itself furnish a
sufficient criterion. This point has been hitherto overlooked, and he believes
his contribution will make for an advance in the future.
It is a relief to turn from Recas6ns to Cossio. Cossio, although his lan-
guage is even more abstruse, shows an underlying grasp of realities and quotes
freely from codes and decisions. After all, he has been a practicing lawyer
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and counsel for important banks. The only practical experience Recastns
seems to have had was as a member for a brief period of the Spanish Cortes
under that Republican regime whose utter lack of a sense of reality was one
of the contributing causes of its sad downfall. More Cossio and less Recas~ns
would have made a better balanced book and served to justify the title.
The purpose of Cossio's introductory exposition is to view the judicial
decision from within as a living reality. Positive law alone is law, but the
knowing subject is not a mere spectator; he introduces himself into the law
to animate its meaning, to determine whether it is just or unjust. The valua-
tion he makes is part and parcel of what he sees in the object valued.
This is most strikingly evident in the case of the judge as creator of the
decision. He looks at the law from within with the logic of the "ought to be,"
contributing to its meaning and to its making as living human life. Every
statutory provision is susceptible of more than one interpretation. Contrary to
Recas6ns' view, judicial valuation is immanent in the law and not something
transcendental. That judges do make law needs to be e-plained to the
Latin American in view of the dominant rationalism which Cossio attacks. He
furnishes a satisfactory philosophical justification for this fact of human ex-
perience, and it will undoubtedly be influential in the long run in the improve-
ment of opinions and, as he hopes, in the improvement of the quality of the
judiciary.
The Uruguayan contribution by Llambias de Azevedo, despite its appalling
title, The Eidetics and Aporetics of The Law, and the difficulty of its initial
pages, is in this reviewer's opinion, the soundest and most thoughtful in the
volume. He discusses at length twelve prime characteristics of positive law, in
regard to many of which he differs from the views of Kelsen and Cossio. Sum-
marizing these points, he defines positive law in the aggregate as a bilateral and
retributive system of human enactments to regulate the social conduct of any
circle of men, not necessarily the State, as a means of realizing the values of
the community. He roundly and soundly rejects the identity of state and law.
He also rejects compulsion as of the essence of law. It is only the sanction that
is coercive. The mission of the philosophy of law is to solve doubts as to the jus-
tice of positive law. It will not do to close one's eyes as do the Positivists or to
be silent with the Viennese school. Not "here ends" but "here begins" the
Philosophy of Law.
Two essays by Garcia Maynez of Mexico complete the volume, The Philo-
sophicai-luridical Problem of the Validity of Law and Liberty as Power and
Right. They are both worthwhile and written, for the most part, in language
that can be understood by the average lawyer. If legal philosophers are to help
advance the law, they must speak the language of the man in the courtroom.
Words that cannot be found in either English or Spanish dictionaries may be
current among philosophers, but they are not legal tender in court.
It is a pity that these outstanding Latin Americans, so strongly influenced by
German philosophers, should be unaware of Anglo-American writers on juris-
prudence. A knowledge of the history and evolution of the common law and of
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equity would help them resolve some of their problems. It is not provincial to
believe that the common sense of common law judges is entitled to a higher
rank in the hierarchy of values than the abstractions of a Kelsen and other
Teutonic philosophers and their disciples. On the other hand, adventure in
comparative law teaches us that we have much to learn from the clarity and
scientific methods of authentic Latin American jurists. It is all the more regret-
table, therefore, that public funds and private energy should have been ex-
pended on a volume of this character in preference over the many codes and
excellent treatises that are clamoring for translation and which would give us
a truer insight into the real law of Latin America.
PHANOR JAmES EDERj'
CASES ON FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS-TRADE REGULATION. By S. Chester-
field Oppenheim. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1948. Pp. xxxv, 1044.
$8.50.
PROFESSOR OPPENHEIM'S division of his 1936 Casebook on Trade Regula-
tion into this volume on the anti-trust laws and a forthcoming companion vol-
ume on unfair competitive practices presages the divorce of two topics which
have been associated in law school pedagogy for a generation.1 The association
seems natural. Monopolistic combination and employment of anti-social com-
petitive tactics against trade rivals are often found together. The same statutes
are invoked against both evils: Sherman Act equity decrees commonly enjoin
specific predatory practices which have been used as means of achieving or
maintaining dominance in an industry; and, conversely, the Federal Trade
Commission's control of "unfair methods of competition," which sounds as
though it were directed against predatory practices, is regularly invoked
against combinations of business men whose sin is not that they compete un-
fairly, but that they refrain from competing altogether. Despite this over-
lapping, it needs only a glance at the contents of the standard "trade regula-
tion" casebooks to reveal the wide range of topics embraced in the law of un-
fair competition which have little to do with monopoly or restraint of trade in
the Sherman Act sense. Typical activities dealt with under the heading of
unfair competition include unlawful appropriation of a competitor's trade
marks and good will, misrepresentation of one's own or a competitor's mer-
chandise, inducing breaches of a competitor's contracts or bribing his em-
ployees to betray him.
The marriage of antitrust and unfair competition in our curricula has been
an uneasy one. There were those who suspected that it rested on propinquity
t Member New York Bar.
1. The association began with OLIPHANT, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION (1923) ; see




rather than common interests. At Columbia Law School a curriculum subcom-
mittee proposed a separation several years ago. A distinguished economist of
great experience in the trade regulation field declared that the materials in the
leading casebooks did not have "sufficient coherence to be treated as a single
unit."2 Indeed, the two standard works, Oppenheim and Handler,3 tended to
fall apart in the middle like badly composed pictures. The transition from
problems of integration in the coal or steel industry to questions of confusing
similarity of trade names was likely to be too strenuous for teachers as well as
students. In more than one school where these bifocal books were used the
course actually given came to be confined substantially to one subject or the
other. Professor Oppenheim now acknowledges that the two traditions have
different roots, that laws for the maintenance of a competitive economy hardly
raise the same issues as laws restraining fraud, theft and other abuses to which
the pressures of competition may force some entrepreneurs. 4 The former is a
question of community structure, of the allocation of economic power and re-
sponsibility among governmental and non-governmental agencies. The latter
is a police problem.
But if the basic significance of the anti-trust laws is their tendency toward
decentralization of economic power as the best guarantee of industrial progress
and individual liberty, the casebooks of the future will have not only to slough
off unfair competition but also to expand into a consideration of the important
body of laws which favor centralization of power. The very perception which
requires the anti-trust laws to be segregated for study from unfair competition
seems also to require that they be studied together with the sanctioned monopo-
lies of patent and public utility franchise; with the laws which create govern-
ment monopolies in such significant areas as postal service, liquor distribution,
atomic energy, and (in England) coal, transport and communications; with the
strange new forms of competition between government and private enterprise,
as under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act; and with the phenomenon of
public subsidies to underwrite the risks of private "venture capital." The full
significance of the Robinson-Patman Act requiring price and service equality in
interstate sales is exposed if one sees the act as an extension to general com-
mercial activity of standards highly developed in connection with public utility
operations. Consideration of the National Recovery Act gives a new perspec-
tive, to the picture of trade association activity. To neglect the Commodity
Clause of the Interstate Commerce Act( is to overlook one important solution
for problems of discrimination and vertical integration. Only by a study of this
scope can one deal comprehendingly with these basic political, economic and
2. Corwin D. Edwards, The Place of Economics in the Cotirse on Trade Regulation,
1 LEGAL ED. 1-2 (1948).
3. HANDLEa, CASES ON TRADE REGULATION (1937).
4. Pp. 58-59.
5. E.g., §§ 2 and 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act, 24 STAT. 379, 380 (1887), 49 U. S.
C.-%2 and 3 (1946).
6. 24 STAT. 379 (1887), 49 U.S. C. § 1 (8) (1946).
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legal issues of'our trbubled times: when is plaiining (by industry cartel or po-
litical agency) to be substituted for the automatic control of competitive mar-
kets; who then shall plan and what shall be the mechanisms of control?
There are obvi6us dangers and difficulties in attempting so broad a synthesis
as is here proposed. Whole sections of the usual courses in anti-trust or public
utility law might have to be drastically compressed in order to accommodate
new materials. It would be necessary for the case system of presentation to
give way in part to a method which permits more rapid coverage of subject
matter. One would have to guard against the temptation to convert trade regu-
lation into a discourse on political economy; the breadth of the proposed
inquiry must after -all justify itself by cultivating the lawyer's special skill in
dealing with legal rules, the inevitably rigid formulae in which policy determi-
nations are embodied. There would be grave danger of superficiality; but this
is an inevitable risk in any undertaking to elicit from this world of infinite par-
ticulars a manageable pattern of useful generalities. A good legal education
must cultivate both the power to make these generalizations and the comple-
mentary power to probe intensively into the particulars of the case. A course
on the anti-trust-laws alone may miss both objectives, being too narrow for suc-
cessful generalization, yet too comprehensive to permit real mastery of the
facts and forces in any one of our basic industries. Despite the difficulties,
therefore, it may be worthwhile to seek that deeper comprehension of law as
an instrument of. economic organization which might be attained by viewing the
problem in a settingbroader than the anti-trust laws.
Professor Oppenheim has, of course, not essayed this experiment, and these
vistas of the possible must not obscure the actuality of his accomplishment in
the present work. In the area which he has chosen to explore, lie has given us a
monumental report, which will be particularly helpful to practitioners and re
searchers in the field. Surely every significant case or leading article within its
scope is registered somewhere in this opus. Lengthy opinions have been con-
densed with skill. Attention is appropriately concentrated on areas of contro-
versy which have recently received much judicial and legislative scrutiny. Any-
one familiar with the actual operation of the anti-trust laws must approve the
generous space allowed for consideration of "Remedies," especially the con-
sent decree. This material' offers a striking and therefore pedagogically useful
demonstration of, how a judicial decree can become very nearly a scheme of
legislative regulation, tailored to the requirements of a particular industry, and
creating'for that industry a particularity of prohibition and affirmative com-
mand that, gives substance to the'Sherman Act's denunciation of "restraint of
trade." -
T';rhe treatment'is, on the whole, conventional. Despite the inclusion of sev-
eral textual notes and excerpts from some nonlegal sources, the development
is almost entirely by cases. One may contrast, for example, Professor Oppen-
heim's 129 pages on "Close-Knit Combinations under the Sherman Act"7 with
7. P. 100 et seq. "
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Professor- Handler's textual "Review of the Supreme Court Decisions" in the
same field.8 Opinions may differ also on the selection of auxiliary economic
readings. Is it worthwhile indoctrinating law students in the taxonomy of theo-
retical economics, including definitions of monopsony, duopoly, oligopoly; of
competition that can be "perfect," "pure," "imperfect," "monopolistic," "cut-
throat" or "predatory" 79 On the other hand, in discussing mergers and con-
solidations do we not owe the student at least a summary of the Federal Trade
Commission's surprising findings on Relative Efficiency of Large, Mcdium-
sized, and Soull Business? °
My most serious quarrel is with the general plan of organization. Parts II
and III are the main branches of the anlysis. Part II deals with "Mergers,
Consolidations and Monopoly." Part III, which occupies more than half the
book, is entitled "Individual Transactions and Loose Associations under the
Federal Anti-Trust Laws, including Selected Non-Federal Precedents." The
unifying principle of these main divisions is not easy to detect. The range of
Part III, embracing as it does chapters on price fixing, patent pools, tying, boy-
cotts and cartels, suggests that it is simply a compendium of all substantive anti-
trust problems not covered in Part II. What then is the distinctive problem of
Part II? The bulk of it is chapter four on close-knit combinations, introduced
as showing "the development of the rule of reason" and to "illustrate types of
combinations which have been proceeded against for violation of the Sherman
Act."" But the rule of reason has been developed and applied at least as often
and as interestingly in cases involving price-fixing contracts and loose associa-
tions as in dose-knit combination cases. Mere illustration of Sherman Act pro-
ceedings hardly offers an adequate standard for selecting, editing or ordering
of materials in a single chapter of limited scope. Two of the three cases'" in
chapter five, which is entitled "Monopoly under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,"
are also "close-knit" cases. It is hard to find any basis for putting the Steel
case in one chapter and the Atminum case in another, and still harder to see
why the Ainerican Tobacco case, an example of conspiracy inferred from uni-
form action on price and other matters, appears here divorced from either the
note on price leadership in chapter four or the discussion of loose associations
which is reserved for Part III. The "monopoly concept" which purports to
give coherence to chapter five, like the rule of reason concept on which chapter
four is strung, is too comprehensive a rubric for any single segment of the anti-
trust analysis.
Part IV on Remedies illustrates the conflict between teaching tool and practi-
8. Handler, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 387 ct seq.
9. TNEC Monograph 21 (1940), quoted in the Casebook at p. 71.
10. TNEC Monograph 13 (1941), which is merely cited along with other references
at page 83 of the Casebook.
11. P. 100.
12. United States v..Aluminum Co. 148 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) ; United States v.
Pullman Co., 50 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1943) ; American Tobacco Co. v. United States.
328 U. S. 781 (1941).
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tioner's handbook that occasionally manifests itself. The consent decree, dis-
solution, and treble damage suits are topics certainly to be taken into account in
a scholarly inquiry into the monopoly laws. But these are interspersed with
sections of little pedagogic value on immunity of witnesses, intervention,
counterclaim, res judicata and, statute of limitations. The controlling consider-
ations and traditions on these questions are largely independent of the sub-
stantive issues of economic organization upon which the book focuses, and a
student could of course acquire only the most superficial notions on these points
from this fragmentary anti-trust gloss. Query also whether two cases like
United States v. Borden Co.13 and Parker v. Brown14 are most effectively em-
ployed in a subdivision of the Remedies chapter entitled "Defenses-Implied
Statutory Exemption." This suggests an approach to them as exercises in the
dialectic of statutory interpretation rather than as dramatic incidents in two
great adjustments taking place in our economic and political structures: .(1)
the adjustment of state planning in agriculture to a still competitive industrial
system, and (2) the correlation of federal and state powers over economic or-
ganization.
Yet rearrangement of materials is the privilege, almost the duty, of any
teacher capable of an individual interpretation of the phenomena within his ken.
The comments on organization therefore do not seriously impugn the merit of
Professor Oppenheim's book, which, if nothing else, provides convenient ac-
cess to an important body of law and constitutes a solid, if unspectacular, ad-
vance in our comprehension of the legal status of monopoly and trade restraint,
Louis B. SCHWAiTZt
THE MEANING OF HUMAN HISTORY. By Morris R. Cohen. La Salle, Ill.:
Open Court Publishing Co., 1947. Pp. 304. $4.00.
In these Carus Lectures delivered by Professor Cohen in 1944, three years
before his death, we are privileged to witness one of the keenest, liveliest, most
profound and orderly minds our generation has known wrestle "in the field of
history, as elsewhere, with such permanent problems as those involved in the
reconciliation of the empirical and the rational, the mental and the physical,
change and persistence, unity and diversity, value and existence, chance and
determination."' Since history "unfortunately has not arranged itself to suit
the convenience of historians," 2 the facts of human history,3 like the facts of
13. 308 U. S. 188 (1939).
14. 317 U. S. 341 (1943).
tAssistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
1. P.35.
2. P. 225.
'3. For an interesting' attempt to answer the question with what facts history is con.
cerned, see SCHRECKER, WoRK AND HISTORY (1948). Cf. Konvitz, Book Review, Saturday
Review of Literature, June 5, 1948, p. 32.
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nature and of mind, challenge philosophical enquiry. Professor Cohen was not
one to run away from a problem. He noted a "human disinclination and in-
ability" to learn from history as itself constituting one of the outstanding facts
of history ,4 but he himself, as these lectures eminently demonstrate, was free
from this vice. He brought to bear on the methodological, scientific and philo-
sophical problems that the field of history presents the same great qualities of
mind and spirit that he employed when coping with the problems of scientific
method in Reason and Naturerl with the problems of legal philosophy in Law
and the Social Order,' with the problems of logic in An Introduction to Logic
and Scientific Method- and Preface to Logics and with the problems of politics
in The Faith of a Liberal.9 One ends The Meaning of Humnan History with a
refreshed awareness of the fact that its author was the most encyclopedic phi-
losopher our century has thus far known, a twentieth century Aristotle.
The past, Professor Cohen said, "has left such a mark on the present that in
some way it may be said to be always with us." Thus:
"If a pebble obstructs the growth of a tree and causes a certain di-
vision in it, the tree will always bear the mark. So the experiences of
youth, the language we have learnt, the manners in which we have
been trained, become part of our nature. And so the past laws of a
country, its old institutions, and the general traditions which constitute
its etlos and character are active forces in the present, and in that
sense history is a necessary guide for the understanding of the pres-
ent. . . ."1 The past literally continues into the present. Past condi-
tions, such as old ideas and habits, buildings, fields, and laws, continue
to operate. Inertia is the first law of history, as it is of physics. Every
event is an integral part of a larger segment of history, and the task of
tracing causal connections is the task of discovering those elements
that persist through, and despite, the arbitrary cuts by which we mark
off the event we are at the moment seeking to explain.""
Since the past is with us now, the discovery of the persistent elements in hu-
man history is a matter of no small importance. The discovery can be made
through investigations that are controlled "by the strictest rules of evidence,"12
by testing every general proposition through observation and experiment.
Historic investigation, to the extent that it involves scientific investigation and
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involves imagination, for the historian needs "an imaginative capacity for see-
ing threads of connection between historic facts and significant issues."1 4 The
ideal to which the greatest historians have aspired is that of "an imaginative re-
construction of the past which is scientific in its determinations and artistic in
its formulation."' 5
There are, of course, subjective factors that "color" all histories. The his-
torian sees things from his chosen perspective, and his selected theory of causa-
tion will determine for him the events that are related. "But this is true also
within natural science. The presence of assumptions or hypotheses does not
vitiate but rather strengthens the argument, provided we recognize these ele-
ments for what they are."1 Social movements can be explained only in terms
of constants or identities, and these "connections or identities the historian
must find. He does not create them."' 7 If the meaning of an event is found in
its relations to other events with which it is connected, "the meaning of history
is not created by the historian but discovered by him." What the historian
makes is "not the past but findings about it." 18
These findings, however, should not be in terms only of constants. Nature
and history show events that are "accidental of fortuitous coincidences."' 0
There is relative necessity and also contingency in history, for these terms are
always relative to a selected system that is finite or limited in perspective. It is
the same with human events as with physical happenings; their necessity is
conditional, for "no event is necessary absolutely or by itself, but only in so far
as it is connected with other events and is thus part of a system."2 Since we
may be living in a really pluralistic world, we have accidents when two rela-
tively independent streams of causality meet and their meeting is not deducible
from either alone or from the two together.21 The historian should not try to
expunge from the history he is writing "the notion of accident as the coinci-
dence of independent streams of events." '
Since the world may be really pluralistic, no single factor or account (politi-
cal, religious, economic, psychologic, etc.) can give us a complete explanation
of the'historic process. A purely political, religious or economic account is only
a partial story; it can never give us the fundamentalinterpretation. "General
history must work with a number of factors rather than with only one," "3 The
monistic approach makgs its appeal by reason of its simplicity and apparently














Professor Cohen arrived at these conclusions only after a painstaking ex-
amination of the leading monistic philosophies of history, which he discussed
in chapters devoted to the geographic, biologic, institutional, and "great men"
approaches in the writing of history. These chapters are among the most im-
pressive and valuable in the book.
Toward the end of book Professor Cohen permitted himself to state some
conclusions suggested by his life-long study of history. While he apparently
failed to find sufficient time for their elaboration and for testing their verifica-
tion, he considered them sufficiently significant to state them.
"'To my mind," he said, "the idea of polarity and oscillation between opposite
poles has a good deal more to contribute to historiography than the notions of
perpetual progress or perpetual degeneration." 2 4 The dominant forces in hu-
man nature which seemed to him relevant for an understanding of history are
"the expansive forces, which involve adventure, and the centralizing or or-
ganizing forces, which protect us against those elements that would destroy us.
Fear and freedom are thus two poles of human life. Without freedom to e x-
pand or grow life would become impossible, but without fear, which leads us
consciouSly or unconsciously to guard against danger, life would soon be de-
stroyed.' 2 5; Human history is full of human failures, brutalities and stupidities;
human tragedies fill the pages of history. But despair and cynicism need not
follow from this. Knowledge of the truth "is in the end the only truly liberat-
ing and thus ethically sustaining force."26 The e-xpansive and centralizing
forces in life,--the principle of polarity-are the basis of hope which sustains
human life. Brute power has defeated many good causes, but history shows
"that good causes are more often defeated by negligence in the pursuit of the
right than by positive forces of evil; and while it is true that brute power can
for a limited time crush the human spirit, history also shows that the spirit of
truth has a superior vitality and thus truth, even though for a time crushed to
earth, rises again." 7
One may ask the question whether Professor Cohen could, if challenged.
have proved the proposition that history shows that the spirit of truth has a su-
perior vitality. Perhaps this is the sort of proposition that can neither be proved
nor disproved. Indeed, Professor Cohen himself has said that "history can-
not prove any moral rules" ;28 yet, if history shows the superior vitality of truth,
why can it not also show the superior vitality of goodness, which itself may be
defined as a species of truth? Professor Cohen speaks of the "fundamental
truth" of the saying of Jesus: "What is a man profited, if he shall gain the
whole world, and lose his own soul ?"-O Is this a "fundamental truth" of physi-






29. P. 296, quoting Matt. XVI:26.
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If pressed, I suspect that Professor Cohen would have admitted that he be-
lieved in the superior vitality of truth in human history as an article of faith.
Faith can move mountains. A man's view of what is happening is itself a cause
of what happens. "You cannot," said Professor Cohen, "rule human purposes
and knowledge out of human life and history. The belief that we are victori-
ous ...influences our conduct."30 Had he not believed in the superior vitality
of truth, Cohen could not have been the great teacher that he was for over
forty years.
"To widen our horizon," said Professor Cohen, "to make us see other points
of view than those to which we are accustomed, is the greatest service that can
be rendered by the historian." 3' When history is studied with an ethical inter-
est, he said, it will widen our experiences and horizons, "like intelligent visits
to foreign countries or conversing with great and unique personalities. Our
problems may not thereby be solved, but they are illumined." 32 Has he not in
these statements concerning the role and utility of historians in fact stated his
own function and significance as a philosopher? One finishes the book with a
consciousness that one has enjoyed the inestimable privilege of a conversation
with a great and unique personality, that one has visited remote "places of
nestling green for poets made." 33
MiLTON R. KONVITzt
THE ROOSEVELT COURT. By C. Herman Pritchett. New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1948. Pp. xvi, 314. $5.00.
THE ROOSEvELT COURT is the fourth in what promises to be a long series
of popular essays to resolve the enigma of a Court moulded by a single Pres-
ident but .reflecting the many divergent views that contributed to the long
tenure of the New Deal. Thus far we have had an analysis by a journalist,1
a lawyer,2 and an historian.3 None of these has satisfied the partisans.4 Pro-
fessor Pritchett's perspective is that of a political scientist-statistician, albeit
a "statistician, misled by the fallacy of supposing all cases to'be equally im-
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The inspiration for this "full-scale inductive and statistical inquiry into
the nature and operation of the process of judicial decision maling"- is at-
tributed to Lord Kelvin's maxim: "When you cannot measure, your knowl-
edge is meager and unsatisfactory." s  Perhaps Professor Pritchett should
have read further among the English physicists before attempting the statis-
tical analysis. He might then have discovered that there are matters beyond
measurement even by the magic of mathematics.0 And a fortunate discovery
it might have been; Professor Pritchett's textual material is always interesting
and often valid, but his statistics seldom partake of either of these attributes.
The proclivity of the Justices of this Court toward writing concurring and
dissenting opinions provides grist for Professor Pritchett's statistical mill.
Except for Mr. Justice Frankfurter's avowed belief in individual opinions
restrained only by the "volume of the Court's business,"10 however, he, no
more than his predecessors, is able to explain this phenomenon. Pritchett does
suggest that this mass production of opinions might be caused by an attempt to
emulate the great dissents of Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo. But the mem-
bers of the Court are certainly aware that in a number of cases the "great
dissenters," disagreed with the majority, but failed even to indicate their
dissent.11 (If the approach of the book were psychological rather than sta-
tistical, the author might look to the fact that many of the Justices prior to
their appointments had been accustomed to the role not only of first violin
but of concertmaster; second fiddle becomes a very difficult instrument to
play under such circumstances. But it is more likely that no single explana-
tion exists; each of the justices has his own reasons for writing non-majority
opinions.) Whatever the cause, the non-unanimous opinions are legion. And
the author's major assumption is that these "non-unanimous opinions admit
the public to the Supreme Court's inner sanctum."' 2
It is apparent that Professor Pritchett's entree to the "inner sanctum" is
only by means of these opinions. But it is this very distance from the Court
that lends to the book an objectivity often absent in similar critiques. Ob-
Swan, 57 YALE L. J. 167, 172 (1948)), I must state that a part of my legal apprenticeship
was served as Law Secretary to Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
7. P. xiii.
8. P.xi.
9. E.g., JEANS, PHYSICS AND PHLOSOPHY 15-16 (1943). Professor Pritchett
admits an awareness "of the limitations of statistical methods in dealing with ma-
terials of the kind involved here. The greater precision and certainty which
such methods appear to yield may, under the circumstances, be in part illusory.
Nevertheless, I am convinced that the counting and charting have a positive contribution to
an understanding of the motivations of the present Court." P. xv.
10. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, in Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306
U.S. 466, 487 (1939). See also Frankfurter and Landis, The Suprciei Court Undcr The
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Term 1928, 43 HARv. L. REv. 33, 47 (1929).
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jectivity, however, is not enough; accuracy too is a requisite. But Professor
Pritchett's statistics are distorting mirrors rather than true reflectors. In
addition to treating cases as "fungibles," his categorizations as "left" or
"right" depend solely on whether a Justice has voted for or against "labor,"
"civil liberties," administrative agencies, release of the convicted, corporate
taxation, state regulation of business, etc. Neither the merits of the cases
nor the reasoning of the opinions affect these statistics. In spite of the mul-
titude of opinions, the charts record only votes, in the manner of the voting
machine. It is as if, like the courts of ancient Greece, only ballots were cast
and no opinions written.
Even on the basis adopted by the author, however, it is difficult, in many
cases, to determine which segment of the Court is "right" and which is "left."
For example, it would be interesting to learn which of the factions of the
Court in the Elgin case 3 the author termed "left," especially in view of the
support of the dissent expressed by the amicus briefs of the labor unions and
the Government. I should like to learn also how Mr. Justice Murphy's record
on "civil liberties" can be considered spotless 4 in spite of his majority vote in
the Everson case, 15 for Professor Pritchett would seem to have read Mr. Jus-
tice Rutledge's dissenting opinion. The end product-the charts--is available
for perusal, but the contributing factors are carefully out of sight.
Again, Professor Pritchett's categorizations lead to error. Why, for ex-
ample, are questions of search and seizure issues of "crime and punishment"
and not "civil liberties"? Which is more indicative of a police state, the de-
struction of rights of privacy or the refusal of the privilege to use the mails at
low cost? The categorization in this book would indicate the author's belief
that the latter is the more fundamental.
If the text is less vulnerable than the charts, it nevertheless reveals many
chinks. Professor Pritchett's theme here is that the Court is "a political in-
stitution performing a political function."'16 Whether he means by this that
the Court's constitutional opinions reflect the social pressures of the com-
munity,' 7 or that each Justice casts his vote on the basis of his personal prefer-
ences as do legislators,'8 is not clear. Certainly the former is a valid func-
tion of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy; the latter is not.
On the constitutional level, Professor Pritchett accurately reports a unanim-
ity of policy in dealing with federal statutes. Only two congressional en-
actments have been declared unconstitutional, 9 and neither was of wide im-
13. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945), 327 U.S. 661 (1946).
14. Mr. Justice Murphy "has a 100 per cent record in upholding civil liberties since
1941." P. 259.
15. Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
16. P. xiii. This statement is quoted with approval from Professor Konefsky.
17. Cf. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurring, in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,
329 U.S. 459, 466 (1947).
18. P. 19.




portance. Different criteria are used in dealing with state statutes, though
both "left" and "right" agree in theory that the states are to be inhibited as
little as possible. The "left" side of the Court sets off the area of freedom
for state regulations primarily in matters of economics while the "right" is
more restrictive of possible infringements on the national realm of commerce.
On the other hand, the "left" is very restrictive of the states where "personal
liberties" are involved while the "right" gives much leeway in this sphere.
Nevertheless, both claim to be following the dictates of Mr. Justice Holmes'
judicial philosophy. For example, Mr. Justice Black and AMr. Justice Jack-
son have each recently invoked Mfr. Justice Holmes' opinion in Baldz n v.
21issour 20 as his guide for action in construing the Fourteenth Amendment.2 L
The revealed differences are differences in judgment not in policy.' The
test will come, however, when the state legislation restricting organized labor
comes before the Court. Theoretically the "left," if consistent, will have to
permit the states the same scope here as had been granted them in regulating
business. But an articulated judicial philosophy may give way to an inarticu-
late premise, and the "rights" of labor may be placed in the amorphous cate-
gory of "civil rights," beyond limitation by the states. 2
It is on the non-constitutional level that Professor Pritchett's tex-tual analy-
sis is strikingly faulty. "Judicial work that claims or vields supremacy over
legislation is quite different from judicial work that is confessedly subordinate
and interstitial."3 But Professor Pritchett is unaware of this basic distinc-
tion. Thus, for example, in analyzing the Girouard case -4 which involved
no constitutional issue, he states:
"For the members of the Girouard majority were also avare of the same
claims for legislative deference to which Stone yielded, but their concern for cvil
liberty was strong enough to override them."
In other words, though the Justices knew what Congress intended, they could
disregard it. "Legislative deference" and "concern for civil liberties" may be
competing considerations where a constitutional question is present; but "legis-
lative deference" must occupy the field where the only issue is the "prolifera-
tion of the purpose of Congress."26  It is this basic misconception of the
role of the Court that causes much of the author's misinterpretation of opin-
ions.
Professor Pritchett's book is written for neither the layman nor the lawyer;
20. 281 U.S. 586, 595 (1930).
21. Mr. Justice Black, concurring in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 322, at 326 (1945) ; Mr. Justice Jackson, in Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
22. See Kurland, The U. S. Suprcme Court Docket, Fortune, November 1943, p. 179.
23. POW.LL, MY PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 277 (1941).
24. Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946).
25. P. 255.
26. For some modern trends in statutory interpretation, see Wolfson, Book Revicw,
23 IxD. L. J. 381 (1948).
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its technical references are too overwhelming for the one and insufficient for
the other. It should probably be weighed by the audience for which it was
intended: fellow political scientists. For the lawyers, however, though Pro-
fessor Pritchett may have added to their knowledge about the Court, he has
not contributed to their understanding of it.
PHiLip B. KURLANDt
t Member of the New York Bar.
